That happened in Trump’s first term, when the U.S., EU and Japan joined forces to clamp down on Beijing’s nonmarket practices, such as lavishing subsidies on companies that went on to aggressively undercut, and claim market share from, their European, American or Japanese rivals.
In her own first term von der Leyen developed an arsenal of trade defense tools and demonstrated increasing willingness to use them. Her second-term agenda has prioritized economic security — or ensuring Europe’s cutting-edge technology and research doesn’t fall into hostile hands — as part of a more assertive economic foreign policy.
In China’s own eyes the issue with the EU is an “insignificant skirmish” when compared with potential tensions between Beijing and Washington, Gao added.
And it’s not just Trump. In May, the Joe Biden administration quadrupled tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to 100 percent — at a stroke making the EU’s own, far lower, duties appear inadequate.
“No matter who wins between Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, no matter the Republicans or the Democrats, they view China as a rival. But for Trump, it’s also damaging the transatlantic relationship,” the Chinese business insider said.
Threading the needle
For now, the bloc remains in damage-control mode — clinging on to the World Trade Organization’s trade rulebook as its two main trading partners slug it out in a geopolitical bare-knuckle fight.